

# Miguel-Angel, Alcobendas

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## CONTACT INFORMATION

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## PERSONAL INFORMATION

Gender: Male Citizenship: Spain / U.S. Permanent Green Card Holder

**Placement Officer:** Prof. Christian Hellwig. Phone: +33 561 128-593. Email: christian.hellwig@tse-fr.eu

**Placement Secretary:** Ms. Aude Schloesing. Phone: +33 561 128-765. Email: aude.schloesing@tse-fr.eu

## FIELDS OF INTEREST

Empirical Industrial Organization, Econometrics, and Economics of Transportation

## EDUCATION

Visiting Student - University of California - Irvine, United States	May 2012 - Present
Ph.D., Economics - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse, France	Sep 2009 - Expected Jun 2014
M.A., Models and Methods of Quantitative Economics - Autonomous University of Barcelona - Barcelona, Spain & Pantheon-Sorbonne University - Paris, France	Sep 2005 - Sep 2007
B.A., Economics - Autonomous University of Barcelona - Barcelona, Spain	Sep 1999 - Jun 2003
B.E., Industrial Engineering - Polytechnic University of Catalonia - Barcelona, Spain	Sep 1995 - Feb 1999

## RESEARCH PAPERS

- "Congestion at Airports: Implementing a Two-Part Landing Fee at San Francisco International Airport". JMP
- "Airline-Airport Agreements in the San Francisco Bay Area: Effects on Airline Behavior and Congestion at Airports". Forthcoming in a special issue of Economics of Transportation "Airlines and Airports"
- "Immunized International Alliances: a Sequential Game of Alliance Formation in the Airline Industry". Working Paper
- "Dynamic Pricing: the Service Expansion of US Airways at Ronald Reagan National Airport" (with Marc Ivaldi). Work-in-Progress

## WORK EXPERIENCE

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics GSE – Barcelona, Spain	Nov 2008
Lecturer: Review of Mathematics for Graduate Students (English) - Master of Economics of Science and Innovation	
<b>Autonomous University of Barcelona</b> – Barcelona, Spain	
Lecturer: Statistics for undergraduate students	Feb 2008 – Sep 2009
Teacher Assistant: Statistics, Macroeconomics and Econometrics courses for undergraduates	Feb 2006 – Sep 2007
<b>Autonomous University of Barcelona</b> – Barcelona, Spain	Sep 2007 – Sep 2009
Research Assistant of Professor Salvador Barberà: Study about the capacity of Catalonia of attracting high skilled workers: Brain Gain vs. Brain Drain.	

**Albatros 2.000 S.L.** – Barcelona, Spain  
Office Manager

*May 1999 – May 2002 & Jan 2005 – Jul 2005*

- Responsible for different functions from human resources to accounting at a small construction company
- Working as liaison between clients and architects on modifications, and providing customer service
- Handling all hiring and lay-off procedures including paper work
- Accounting: issuing invoices, collecting payments and contacting banks regarding financial status

**EADS CASA Space S.L.** – Madrid, Spain

*Feb 2004 – Nov 2004*

Accounting Assistant

- Assisting accountants in the financial department at an international aerospace manufacturer
- Responsible for bookkeeping, processing invoices and contacting suppliers for payment/invoice status in English and French

**Alstom** – Barcelona, Spain

*Feb 1998 – Mar 1999*

Welding Engineer

- Responsible for preparing welding procedures at a worldwide company specialized in transport and energy infrastructure
- Reviewing the performance and progress of students at welding school

## LANGUAGES

English (Fluent), French (Intermediate), Spanish (Native)

## COMPUTER SKILLS

Latex, Microsoft Office, R, Matlab, Python, Mathematica, Stata, SAS

## REFERENCES

### Research:

#### **Professor Marc Ivaldi (advisor)**

Toulouse School of Economics  
(France)

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#### **Professor Jan Brueckner**

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(United States)

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#### **Professor Kenneth Small**

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(United States)

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### Teaching Experience:

#### **Professor Juan Carlos Conesa**

Stony Brook University  
(United States)  
Phone: +1 631 632-7540  
E-mail: juan.conesa@stonybrook.edu

### Working Experience:

#### **Professor Salvador Barberà**

Autonomous University of Barcelona  
(Spain)  
Phone: +34 935 811-814  
E-mail: salvador.barbera@uab.es

## RESEARCH PAPERS AND ABSTRACTS

### "Congestion at Airports: Implementing a Two-Part Landing Fee at San Francisco International Airport".

#### *Job Market Paper*

*Abstract:* we discuss the modification in 2008 of the U.S. policy that regulates airport rates and charges. Under the new regulatory framework, airports can charge a two-part landing fee to relieve congestion. Such a landing fee scheme consists of the standard aircraft weight-based charge plus an operation charge applied in peak hours. The question is relevant, since flight delay is a serious problem in the U.S. economy and, so far, no airport has put into practice this type of charging scheme. We develop and estimate a structural model to investigate the consequences of implementing such a two-part

landing fee at San Francisco International airport. Our simulations suggest the higher the operation charge, the lower are the number of flights arriving during peak hours and the bigger are the sizes of aircraft. As a result, the level of congestion and total demand at San Francisco International Airport decrease.

Our model captures important characteristics of the airline industry that most of the previous literature has neglected: endogeneity of airport charges with respect to decisions of travelers and carriers, correlation across markets, and two decision variables of airlines (ticket price and flight frequency).

**"Airline-Airport Agreements in the San Francisco Bay Area: Effects on Airline Behavior and Congestion at Airports".** *Forthcoming in a special issue of Economics of Transportation "Airlines and Airports"*

*Abstract:* This paper provides a methodological framework to analyze the decisions of airlines and travelers taking into account the contractual agreement between airports and airlines. This contract sets the fees that carriers pay for landing, the rental rate for the terminal space that they occupy, as well as the methodology to determine these charges. Using data from San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (OAK), we quantify the effects of changes in the agreement on the behavior of airlines and congestion at airports. In particular, we look at modifications in the design of charges and variations in the operating costs at airports. Counterfactuals suggest that different methodologies to compute charges and changes in airport costs may induce airlines to behave differently, affecting delays at airports.

**"Immunized International Alliances: a Sequential Game of Alliance Formation in the Airline Industry".** *Working Paper*

*Abstract:* This paper analyzes the incentives of competing airlines to form international alliances with carriers operating in other countries, and the concerns that competition authorities may have in granting such agreements. We consider a sequential game where a carrier (leader) first decides if it wants to establish a complementary international alliance with a foreign carrier. This agreement improves partners' coordination on international routes where both operate, letting them benefit from joint fares and capacity on these routes. Then, a competitor (follower) determines whether allying with another foreign carrier is its best response to the action taken by the leader. The alliance affects not only the international markets where airlines coordinate, but also the nature of competition in domestic markets. Several equilibria arise depending on the strength of the brand loyalty of travelers, economies of traffic density, and synergies derived from the alliance. Welfare analysis suggests that when forming an international alliance belongs to the set of equilibria, total surplus does not always increase. In some cases the leader decides to coordinate even if the alliance creates negative synergies, with the objective of deterring the alliance formation of the follower. In this scenario, competition authorities should be concerned about granting antitrust immunity to the alliance.

**"Dynamic Pricing: the Service Expansion of US Airways at Ronald Reagan National Airport" (With Marc Ivaldi).**

*Work-in-Progress*

*Abstract:* we want to exploit an original data-set to analyze the effects of the service expansion of US Airways at Ronald Reagan National Airport. Such an expansion is the result of the agreed swap of takeoff/landing rights with Delta in exchange of rights at La Guardia Airport. Consequently, US Airways opened new routes during the summer of 2012. Using scraping techniques, we collected daily fare data from a popular travel search engine before and after the entry of the airline in the routes. We want to study the consequences of the entry of US Airlines, if any, and explore the causes that may explain them. There exist papers studying how prices evolve over time for the same flight (for instance, Escobari (2009, 2012) and Lazarev (2013)). However, we are not aware of any paper discussing the impact of the entry of a new competitor on the pricing path.